Use of Trademarks as Keywords in Google Ads: Where the Law Stands in India and Across the World

Introduction

There is a peculiar quiet to the way most trademark battles are now fought. No counterfeit goods change hands at a shopfront, no deceptive packaging arrives in a consumer's home. Instead, a business types a rival's brand name into a search engine, expects to find that rival, and is met first by an advertisement for the competitor who quietly purchased that very brand name as a keyword. The mark is never seen. It works in the background, an invisible instruction that decides whose advertisement appears at the top of the page. Whether this silent appropriation of another's goodwill amounts to trademark infringement is one of the most consequential questions in contemporary intellectual property law, and courts across the world have answered it in strikingly different ways.

This article examines the legal position on the use of trademarks as keywords in Google Ads and sponsored search advertising, in India and in the principal common law and European jurisdictions. It traces how the leading courts have approached the question, identifies the tests they apply, and offers practical guidance for brand owners, advertisers, founders and in-house teams who must navigate a terrain that has shifted considerably in recent years, most dramatically in India itself.

How Keyword Advertising Works, and Why Trademark Law Struggles With It

A brief explanation of the mechanism is necessary, because the legal analysis turns almost entirely on it. Google's advertising programme, formerly known as AdWords and now simply Google Ads, permits advertisers to bid on keywords. When a user runs a search containing a chosen keyword, the advertiser's sponsored link becomes eligible to appear above or alongside the organic results. The advertiser pays each time a user clicks. Crucially, the keyword that triggers the advertisement need never appear in the advertisement that the user actually sees. An advertiser may therefore bid on a competitor's trademark so that its own advertisement surfaces whenever consumers search for that competitor, all without the trademark ever being displayed.

It is this divergence between the visible advertisement and the invisible trigger that has confounded trademark law. The classical function of a trademark is to identify the source of goods or services. Infringement has traditionally required some use of the mark that is perceptible to the consumer and that is likely to cause confusion as to origin. A keyword, hidden in the back end of an advertising auction, fits awkwardly within these categories. Is it use of the mark at all? If it is, is it use that the law should restrain, or is it simply the digital equivalent of a shopkeeper stocking a rival's product on a nearby shelf so that customers comparing options may find an alternative? The answers, as we shall see, depend heavily on the jurisdiction.

The Indian Position: A Framework Settled, Then Unsettled

India's law on keyword advertising has developed in two distinct movements. The first established a careful, balanced framework. The second, in 2026, pushed that framework to its furthest limit and made India, for the moment, a global outlier.

The Foundational Framework: DRS Logistics

The decisive authority is the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd., reported as 2023:DHC:5615-DB and 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4809, delivered on 10 August 2023 by a Bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan. The dispute arose from the well-known logistics mark AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS, whose proprietor complained that competitors' advertisements surfaced when consumers searched for its mark. The Single Judge had earlier held, in a judgment reported as 2021 (88) PTC 217 (Del), that such use could constitute infringement and had directed Google to investigate the proprietor's complaints.

On appeal, the Division Bench framed four questions and answered each with care. It held, first, that the use of a trademark as a keyword does amount to use of the mark "in advertising" within the meaning of Section 29(6) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and that invisible use is nonetheless use. Second, it held that the use is not confined to the advertiser but extends to Google itself, given the active part the platform plays in suggesting, auctioning and ranking keywords and in earning revenue from the resulting clicks. The Bench expressly declined to follow the contrary view of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to which we shall return, that a search engine does not itself use the sign.

It is the Bench's third holding that gives the framework its balance. The Court held that the use of a registered trademark as a keyword does not, by itself, amount to infringement. There is no monopoly over the results page that a search of one's mark may produce, for consumers searching a brand may legitimately be seeking reviews, comparisons, alternatives or information. Infringement must be established through the ordinary statutory routes, principally a likelihood of confusion under Section 29(2), or unfair advantage or detriment to a mark with a reputation under Section 29(4). Fourth, the Bench held that the safe harbour available to intermediaries under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 would not shield Google if its own conduct were found to be infringing.

The significance of DRS Logistics lies in this dual character. It is expansive on the question of use, holding that a hidden keyword is use of the mark and use by Google as well, yet restrained on the question of infringement, refusing to treat keyword bidding as unlawful in itself. That balance became the governing principle of Indian law and was promptly applied in the cases that followed.

The Framework Applied: MakeMyTrip and Policybazaar

In MakeMyTrip (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Booking.com B.V., a Single Judge had granted an injunction on 27 April 2022 restraining the use of the MakeMyTrip mark as a keyword. The Division Bench, in a judgment dated 14 December 2023 reported as 2023:DHC:8960-DB, set that injunction aside. Applying DRS Logistics, the Court held that bidding on a competitor's mark as a keyword, absent a demonstrated likelihood of confusion or unfair advantage, does not infringe. Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition of Section 29(4) in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1, the Bench observed that the dilution remedy under that provision is unavailable where the competing services are similar, as travel services plainly are. A consumer encountering Booking.com's clearly labelled advertisement was unlikely to believe it to be the service of MakeMyTrip.

The matter travelled to the Supreme Court, which, by its order dated 7 March 2024 reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 266, declined to interfere with the Division Bench's order. In the course of doing so, the Bench presided over by the Chief Justice of India observed, in the nature of an oral remark, that a consumer who wished to transact through MakeMyTrip would be unlikely to be confused into dealing with Booking.com when both names were visible on the screen. It should be kept in mind, however, that the dismissal of a special leave petition at the threshold is not the same as a considered pronouncement on the merits after detailed reasoning and full argument. It leaves the Division Bench framework undisturbed and lends it persuasive support, but it does not itself lay down binding law with independent reasoning of its own. It remains, nonetheless, the highest level at which the question has so far been touched in India.

The Delhi High Court applied the same approach in Policybazaar Insurance Web Aggregator Pvt. Ltd. v. Coverfox Insurance Broking Pvt. Ltd. and the companion matter against Acko, decided on 6 September 2023 and reported as 2023:DHC:6407. Justice Navin Chawla held that the mere appearance of a competitor's website as a sponsored link, clearly marked as an advertisement, was insufficient to establish confusion or infringement. It did not assist the plaintiff that it had itself, while pressing its complaint, quietly bid on the marks of the very competitors it was suing.

The Outlier: Hindware v. Google

Against this settled background, the judgment in Hindware Limited v. Grohe India Private Limited, delivered on 22 May 2026 and reported as 2026:DHC:4614, marks a pronounced departure. Decided by Justice Mini Pushkarna after a full trial, and running to 163 pages, it is the most far-reaching decision an Indian court has yet rendered on the subject, and it is the principal reason a domestic article on this question now carries international interest.

The facts were these. Hindware, the proprietor of the coined and well-known sanitaryware mark HINDWARE, in use since 1991 and declared a well-known mark by the Delhi High Court by its order dated 21 April 2017, discovered that competitors including Grohe and Cera had purchased HINDWARE and its variants as keywords. The advertisers settled and suffered consent decrees, leaving Google LLC and Google India as the sole contesting defendants. The question, therefore, was squarely whether Google's facilitation of bidding on a registered mark, without the proprietor's consent and without sharing the resulting revenue, amounted to infringement.

The Court held that it did. On the question of use, Justice Pushkarna held that the expression "in any other relation whatsoever" in Section 2(2)(c)(i) must be read widely enough to encompass even invisible use, so that the use of a mark as a keyword, though unseen by the consumer, is use of the mark. The Court rejected Google's submission that Section 29(6)(d) requires the mark to appear within the advertisement, holding that the statute speaks of use "in advertising," a process, and not use "in an advertisement." The decisive finding, however, rested on Section 29(8). The Court held that the auctioning of a coined mark to its proprietor's direct competitors takes unfair advantage of the mark's reputation and is contrary to honest practices in commercial matters, and that a finding of infringement under Section 29(8) does not require proof of a likelihood of confusion. Because HINDWARE is a coined word with no meaning of its own, the Court reasoned, a consumer types it into a search bar only because the proprietor has invested it with reputation, and Google's monetisation of that reputation for the benefit of rivals is precisely the free riding the provision exists to prevent.

On the question of intermediary protection, the Court declined to treat Google as a passive conduit. It held that Google is an active participant in the advertising process, suggesting trademarked terms through its Keyword Planner, conducting the auction, ranking advertisements through its Quality Score, and earning revenue at each click. That characterisation should be read with some caution. Google's current public trademark policy states that it will not restrict the use of trademarks as keywords, but that it may review and restrict trademark use within the ad itself following a complaint against identified advertisers. The precise scope of any regional difference in Google's practice is therefore best stated carefully and supported by current sources. In a passage that has been widely quoted, the Court held that Google cannot be permitted to shrug off responsibility by making available a tool that leads to infringement and then turning around to claim that the tool was not mandatory. The safe harbour under Section 79 was accordingly denied, and Google LLC and Google India were held jointly liable.

The relief was correspondingly firm. The Court granted a permanent injunction restraining both Google entities from using HINDWARE and its variants as keywords, awarded nominal damages of Rupees 30 lakh, being Rupees 15 lakh in each of the two suits, payable jointly and severally, and directed payment of actual costs.

It is important to read Hindware with precision, for its breadth is easily overstated. The judgment did not overrule the DRS Logistics framework; it could not, a Single Judge being bound by a Division Bench. It distinguished that framework. The earlier cases, the Court observed, concerned generic or descriptive terms, whereas HINDWARE is a coined and judicially recognised well-known mark, and the earlier cases had been decided at the interlocutory stage and had not engaged with infringement under Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3) or with the exclusive right conferred by Section 28(1). On a fair reading, Hindware relied upon DRS Logistics for its findings on use and on Google's active role, and parted company with it only on the ultimate question of infringement, and there only because the mark before it was coined and distinctive and the record had been developed at trial.

In our considered view, the broader propositions in Hindware, particularly the use of Section 29(8) to establish infringement without any independent finding of confusion, and the denial of safe harbour as a matter effectively decided on the platform's business model, are likely to be tested on appeal. A single judge cannot dilute the Division Bench's holding that keyword use is not infringement in itself, and the apex court's observations in the MakeMyTrip proceeding, that a consumer seeing both names on screen is not confused, sit uneasily with a finding of liability that dispenses with confusion altogether. The judgment is, for the present, good law on its facts, those facts being a coined and famous mark and a fully tried record, and it should be relied upon as such rather than as a general charter against all keyword bidding.

A useful counterpoint arrived only weeks later. In contempt proceedings in the DRS Logistics matter, decided on 15 June 2026 and reported as 2026:DHC:5102, Justice Tejas Karia held that the earlier directions imposed on Google only a complaint based obligation to investigate, and not a duty to monitor third party advertisements proactively for the use of the marks in advertisement text, titles or web addresses. The contrast with the interventionist temper of Hindware is instructive, and it confirms that the Indian position, far from settled, is presently in motion.

The European Union: The Architecture the World Borrowed

If India now stands apart, it is partly because so much of the world has built upon a common European foundation. The architecture was laid by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, decided in the joined cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 on 23 March 2010. The Court drew a distinction that has proved durable. Google, as the provider of the referencing service, does not itself use the sign within the meaning of the trademark directive; it merely permits its clients to do so. The advertiser does use the sign. But the advertiser infringes only where the advertisement does not enable a normally informed and reasonably attentive internet user to ascertain whether the advertised goods originate from the proprietor of the mark or from a third party. The inquiry, in other words, fixes upon the effect of the visible advertisement on the function of indicating origin, not upon the silent selection of the keyword.

The position was refined the following year in Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc, C-323/09, decided on 22 September 2011. The Court held that the selection of a competitor's mark as a keyword is, in principle, a feature of healthy competition, for it presents consumers with alternatives, and is unobjectionable unless it adversely affects one of the functions of the mark, whether the function of indicating origin, the advertising function or the investment function. For marks with a reputation, the Court recognised that free riding may be actionable, particularly where the advertiser offers imitations rather than genuine alternatives, but it was at pains to hold that the mere appropriation of a rival's keyword, presenting a real alternative without confusion, does not cross the line.

When the Interflora dispute returned to the English courts, the Court of Appeal, in a judgment reported as [2014] EWCA Civ 1403, ordered a retrial and took the opportunity to caution against importing the American doctrine of initial interest confusion into European law, describing it as unnecessary and unhelpful. The average consumer test, properly applied, was sufficient, and the burden of demonstrating an adverse effect on origin lay upon the proprietor.

The companion decision in L'Oréal SA v. eBay International AG, C-324/09, decided on 12 July 2011, addressed the position of online marketplaces and confirmed that the hosting defence is unavailable to an operator that plays an active role giving it knowledge of or control over the data it stores, a principle that resonates, as we have seen, in the Indian courts' treatment of active intermediaries.

The member states have applied this framework with notable consistency. The German Federal Court of Justice, in a line of decisions including Bananabay II and MOST-Pralinen, has held that the origin function is generally not impaired where the advertisement appears in a clearly demarcated advertising block and contains neither the mark nor any reference to its proprietor. The dividing line throughout Europe is the visible advertisement. Where the mark appears in the advertisement text or on the advertiser's landing page, liability follows; where it remains a silent keyword, it generally does not.

One further European development deserves mention, for it points in a direction opposite to that of Hindware. Competition authorities have begun to treat restrictions on keyword bidding not as protections of trademark rights but as restraints on competition. The European Commission, by its decision of 17 December 2018, fined the apparel company Guess in excess of 39 million Euros, finding that its prohibition on authorised retailers bidding on the Guess brand as a keyword was a restriction of competition by object. The trademark owner, in that instance, was penalised not for permitting keyword competition but for suppressing it.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, having retained the relevant European jurisprudence following its departure from the Union, continues to apply the Interflora framework. The most instructive domestic authority is Victoria Plum Ltd. v. Victorian Plumbing Ltd., [2016] EWHC 2911 (Ch), decided by Mr Justice Henry Carr. The two parties traded under confusingly similar names, and each had bid on the other's mark. The Court held that bidding on a competitor's mark is use in the course of trade and infringes where it adversely affects the origin function, which it plainly did where Google's dynamic keyword insertion caused the claimant's mark to appear within the defendant's advertisements. Significantly, the Court rejected the defence of honest concurrent use in this context, holding that the defence permits a trader to use its own name and does not extend to bidding on a rival's mark, still less to conduct that aggravates an already inevitable confusion. Where a trader bids on a competitor's mark and confusion results, it bears a positive obligation to take steps, such as the use of negative keywords, to dispel it. The decision illustrates the consistent European theme that the advertiser's responsibility crystallises around the content and effect of the visible advertisement.

The United States

American law approaches the question through its own doctrinal apparatus, and it has arrived at a destination broadly similar to Europe's, though by a different route. The threshold question of whether the sale of a trademark as a keyword is a use in commerce was answered affirmatively by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). That, however, is only the threshold. Liability under the Lanham Act requires a likelihood of confusion, and the American courts have found this difficult to establish where advertisements are clearly labelled.

The Ninth Circuit, in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated an injunction and held that the standard multi factor confusion analysis governs, with particular weight upon the strength of the mark, evidence of actual confusion, the care exercised by consumers and, above all, the labelling and appearance of the advertisements. Where consumers can see that a result is a sponsored advertisement distinct from the brand they sought, confusion is unlikely. The Fourth Circuit, in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012), declined to dismiss the proprietor's claims where there was evidence of intent and actual confusion, but that case settled, and the broader trend has been against findings of liability for keyword use unaccompanied by a confusing advertisement. The Tenth Circuit's decision in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013), is representative in finding minimal actual confusion and no contributory liability. The doctrine of initial interest confusion, once a promising avenue for proprietors, has waned considerably.

As in Europe, an antitrust counter current has emerged. In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 1 F.4th 102 (2d Cir. 2021), the Second Circuit considered agreements among competitors not to bid on one another's marks as keywords. The Court held that such agreements are not inherently suspect and must be assessed under the rule of reason, with trademark protection serving as a legitimate procompetitive justification, yet it confirmed that they are not immune from antitrust scrutiny. The pressure of competition law, here as in Brussels, runs towards more keyword rivalry rather than less.

Australia

Australian law furnishes perhaps the sharpest contrast with Hindware, because it insists that infringement requires use of the mark as a trademark, that is, as a badge of origin. In Veda Advantage Ltd. v. Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd., [2016] FCA 255, Justice Katzmann held that bidding on the VEDA mark as a keyword was not use of the mark as a trademark at all, observing that a sign invisible to the consumer cannot function as a badge of origin and that the keyword was, in substance, a representation made to Google rather than to the public. Most visible uses of the word in the advertisement text were merely descriptive and protected by the statutory good faith defence. Only where the advertisement displayed an expression such as "The Veda Report Centre," conveying a false connection, did infringement arise. The principle is clear and stands in direct opposition to the Indian court's willingness to find actionable use in the invisible keyword itself.

The Australian position on platform liability is equally distinct. In Google Inc. v. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, [2013] HCA 1, the High Court held unanimously that Google did not engage in misleading or deceptive conduct by displaying advertisers' misleading sponsored links, because it was the advertiser, and not Google, who made the relevant representations. Google was treated as a conduit that neither adopted nor endorsed the advertisers' statements. The decision is a useful reminder of how far Hindware travels in the opposite direction.

Canada

Canadian law reaches a similar resting point through the tort of passing off. In Vancouver Community College v. Vancouver Career College (Burnaby) Inc., 2017 BCCA 41, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that merely bidding on a competitor's mark as a keyword is not, of itself, passing off, for the bid communicates no message to the consumer. The Court corrected the trial judge, however, on an important point of method, holding that confusion is to be assessed at the moment of the searcher's first impression on the results page, and not only once the consumer reaches the landing page. On the facts, the defendant's sponsored link and domain conveyed an impression of association without any disclaimer, and passing off was made out. The earlier decision in Red Label Vacations Inc. v. 411 Travel Buys Ltd., affirmed at 2015 FCA 290, had similarly held that the use of a competitor's marks in invisible metatags is not passing off where no confusion results and the marks do not appear on the visible website, the Federal Court of Appeal declining to adopt the doctrine of initial interest confusion. The Canadian position, in sum, tolerates the invisible keyword while scrutinising the visible advertisement, and it locates the inquiry, sensibly, at the consumer's first impression.

Drawing the Threads Together

When the authorities are laid side by side, a clear pattern emerges, from which India has lately diverged. The following table summarises the position.

The lesson of the comparison is twofold. The first and most reassuring point for advertisers is that, across the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada, the silent purchase of a competitor's mark as a keyword, accompanied by an advertisement that is honest about its origin, is generally lawful. The platform is generally beyond reach, and liability concentrates upon the advertiser whose visible advertisement deceives. The second point is that India has, for the present, departed from this consensus. Through Hindware, an Indian court has held the platform liable and has found the invisible keyword actionable in respect of a coined and famous mark, dispensing with confusion altogether. It bears repeating that India's own DRS Logistics line sits comfortably within the international mainstream, and that Hindware is best understood as a fact sensitive extension whose wider propositions await appellate endorsement.

It is worth observing that the global trend, competition law included, runs gently towards permitting more keyword rivalry rather than less. The penalties imposed upon Guess in Europe, and the cautious approach of the United States courts to agreements restraining keyword bidding, both reflect a settled official preference for competition on the search results page. India's movement, through Hindware, towards platform liability and protection of the invisible keyword is therefore a genuine counter trend, and one that the appellate courts may yet temper. Through all of this, one broad principle recurs across the jurisdictions surveyed. The visible advertisement is, as a rule, where the greatest legal risk is concentrated. An advertiser who keeps a rival's mark out of its advertisement text, its headline, its display address and its landing page is, in most jurisdictions, on considerably safer ground, though not automatically beyond challenge, since courts continue to assess the overall presentation of the advertisement and the likelihood of confusion it creates. An advertiser who places the mark there, by contrast, exposes itself to a materially higher risk of liability.

Practical Guidance

For Brand Owners

The first imperative, when a brand owner suspects that its mark is being exploited in a competitor's advertising, is to preserve evidence before it disappears. Sponsored advertisements are ephemeral, and a contemporaneous record is indispensable. The owner should capture dated screenshots of the entire search results page, the advertisement, its headline, its display address and the landing page to which it leads, and should retain the listing from Google's Ads Transparency Centre. The strongest case, in every jurisdiction including India, lies in the visible advertisement, and the evidence should be assembled with that in mind.

The second step is often a complaint to Google itself. Google's current trademark policy allows trademark owners to submit complaints against specific advertisers and specific advertisements, which places a continuing burden of vigilance upon the brand owner but also offers a swift and inexpensive route to the removal of advertisements that misuse a mark in their text. Many disputes are resolved at this stage without recourse to litigation.

Where litigation becomes necessary, the strategy should be calibrated to the nature of the mark. A coined, invented or famous mark, particularly one that has been declared well-known, now has, in India, significant support in Hindware, which supports action even against pure keyword bidding and against the platform, though the wider reach of that decision awaits appellate endorsement. A descriptive or generic mark will be met by the DRS Logistics and MakeMyTrip line, and the owner should be prepared to demonstrate a genuine likelihood of confusion and to direct attention to the visible advertisement. The decision whether to implead the platform also turns on jurisdiction. In India, following Hindware and DRS Logistics, Google may properly be joined and may be held liable, the safe harbour being far from automatic. In Europe, the United States, Australia and Canada, the advertiser is ordinarily the correct defendant, the platform being generally protected. The remedies available include interim and permanent injunctions, damages, which may be awarded as nominal damages together with actual costs as in Hindware, an account of profits, and takedown.

For Advertisers, Startups and Marketing Teams

The guidance for those running campaigns is more easily stated, because the safe path is reasonably clear. A competitor's mark should never appear in the advertisement text, the headline or the display address. This is the single dividing line that holds across every jurisdiction surveyed, and respecting it removes the great majority of legal risk. Advertisers should employ negative keywords to prevent their advertisements surfacing on a competitor's brand search where confusion is a realistic prospect, and should disable any dynamic keyword insertion that might draw a rival's mark into an advertisement automatically, a feature that proved decisive against the defendant in Victoria Plum.

For the Indian market in particular, and in the wake of Hindware, prudence counsels against bidding on coined, invented or well-known marks even as invisible keywords, while bidding on genuinely descriptive or generic terms remains considerably safer. The landing page should identify the advertiser's own brand clearly and should not suggest any affiliation with the proprietor of the mark searched for. Where two businesses trade under genuinely similar names, a defence of honest concurrent use may be available, but it is a narrow one. As Victoria Plum makes plain, it protects a trader's use of its own name and does not license bidding on a rival's mark, nor does it excuse conduct that deepens an existing confusion.

A final word of caution concerns agreements that restrain keyword bidding. A brand owner may be tempted to extract from competitors or resellers a promise not to bid on its marks. In the United States such agreements are generally defensible under the rule of reason, but the European experience, exemplified by the Guess decision, shows that a prohibition on bidding may itself attract the attention of the competition authorities. The instrument intended to protect a mark may, if drawn too widely, become a liability.

Conclusion

The law on the use of trademarks as keywords has matured into a reasonably coherent body of principle across most of the world, resting upon a distinction first drawn in Luxembourg and since adopted, in substance, from London to Sydney. The invisible keyword, by itself, is generally tolerated; the visible advertisement that deceives is not; and the platform that merely facilitates the auction is generally left undisturbed. India has lately written a more assertive chapter. The framework of DRS Logistics keeps Indian law within the international fold, but Hindware has carried it, at least for coined and famous marks and at least for now, towards a more protective and more interventionist position than any of its peers, holding the platform itself to account and finding the silent keyword actionable without proof of confusion. Whether that chapter endures in its present form will depend upon the appellate courts. What is certain is that the question is no longer a marginal curiosity of advertising practice. It sits at the centre of how brands compete, and how they are protected, in a marketplace that consumers now enter through a search bar.

If your brand is being targeted through competitors' Google Ads campaigns, or if you have received a complaint concerning your own keyword advertising, the intellectual property team at Kunal Khanna & Co. advises brand owners, advertisers and platforms on keyword bidding disputes, online trademark infringement and enforcement strategy. Write to us to arrange a consultation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is it illegal to bid on a competitor's trademark as a Google Ads keyword in India?

It depends upon the mark. Following the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics, the mere bidding on a competitor's mark as a keyword is not, by itself, infringement; the proprietor must show a likelihood of confusion or unfair advantage. However, the 2026 judgment in Hindware v. Google held that bidding on a coined and well-known mark such as HINDWARE infringes even where the mark is invisible, and held Google itself liable. A coined or famous mark therefore enjoys considerably greater protection than a descriptive or generic one.

Can Google itself be held liable for trademark infringement in keyword advertising?

In India, yes, in appropriate circumstances. The Delhi High Court has held that Google is an active participant rather than a passive intermediary, and in Hindware it was denied the safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act and held jointly liable. This is unusual internationally. In the European Union, the United States, Australia and Canada, the platform is generally protected, and the advertiser is the proper defendant.

Does it make a difference if the trademark appears in the advertisement text rather than only as a keyword?

A very significant difference, and this is the one consistent principle across all jurisdictions. The use of a rival's mark in the visible advertisement, whether in the text, the headline or the display address, is far more likely to constitute infringement than the silent selection of the mark as a keyword. Advertisers are generally safe so long as the mark does not appear in the advertisement that consumers actually see.

What is initial interest confusion, and is it recognised in India?

Initial interest confusion is the idea that a consumer's interest may be unlawfully captured by a competitor at the outset of a search, even if any confusion is dispelled before a purchase is made. It originated in the United States, where it has since waned, and it has been expressly doubted by the English Court of Appeal in Interflora and declined by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal. Indian courts have not rested their decisions upon it; the Hindware judgment proceeded instead upon unfair advantage under Section 29(8).

What should I do if a competitor is misusing my brand in Google Ads?

Preserve evidence at once, including dated screenshots of the search results page, the advertisement and the landing page. Consider a trademark complaint to Google, which can secure swift removal of advertisements that misuse a mark in their text. If the matter requires litigation, take advice on the strength of your mark and on whether the platform should be joined, which in India it now may be. Remedies include injunctions, damages and an account of profits.

If You Need Advice

If your brand is being targeted through competitors' Google Ads campaigns, or if you have received a complaint concerning your own keyword advertising, the intellectual property team at Kunal Khanna & Co. advises brand owners, advertisers and platforms on keyword bidding disputes, online trademark infringement and enforcement strategy. For a focused review of your advertising practices or an ongoing dispute, you may write to the firm to arrange a consultation.